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South African law, in line with a number of prominent jurisdictions, recognises the general
rule that when the legality of a contractual term is in dispute, the party who alleges
illegality bears the burden of proof. Possible justifications for the general rule are explored
and it is concluded that the rule is supported by established principles of the law of
evidence, as well as by the pacta servanda sunt principle, which requires that freely
concluded agreements should be enforced. It further is concluded that in disputes over the
legality of restraint of trade clauses there appears to be no compelling reason why the law
should deviate from the general rule by exceptionally placing the burden of proof on the
party seeking enforcement. The mere fact that parties sometimes agree to these terms in
situations of inequality does not suffice. However, those who advocate greater sensitivity
for the position that contracting parties find themselves in when they supposedly exercise
their contractual autonomy express a legitimate concern. A solution supported here is that
South African law should address this problem directly by extending the existing categories
of cases of improperly obtained consent to include cases of exploitation of certain specific
situations of weakness. Such a development would reinforce, rather than subvert, the
pacta servanda sunt principle.
I PROBLEM
This essay considers where South African law places the burden of proof in
disputes over whether a contractual term is illegal — ie whether it is contrary
to statute or contrary to public policy according to the common law.1 While
some standard works do not consider this question at all,2 or only in the
context of certain cases of illegality,3 other works provide varied answers.
Thus, while Van der Merwe et al4 essentially suggest that the party who
alleges the contract bears the burden of proof of legality, others, like Floyd,
maintain that the party who wishes to rely on illegality has to plead it and
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1 See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA1 (A) at 7–8 on various terms that are at
times referred to interchangeably in determining common-law illegality.
2 See, for example, J C de Wet &AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en
Handelsreg 5 ed (1992).
3 See, for example, R H Christie & G B Bradﬁeld The Law of Contract in South
Africa 6 ed (2011) 357 and 380;A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002)
208, 211 and 225 on the onus in the context of restraint of trade clauses and statutory
illegality.
4 S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe
Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 174.
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bears the burden of proof of the illegality.5 Before proceeding to examine this
question more closely, it may be valuable ﬁrst to consider some concepts that
are relevant when trying to understand these positions and their practical
implications.
II KEY CONCEPTS: BURDEN OF PROOF, SPECIAL DEFENCE
AND PRESUMPTIONS
The concepts ‘burden of proof’ or ‘onus of proof’ have not been used
consistently, but the courts have tried to introduce a degree of order. It is said
that the correct use is to denote ‘the duty which is cast on the particular
litigant, in order to be successful, of ﬁnally satisfying the court that he is
entitled to succeed on his claim or defence, as the case may be’.6 This ‘overall
onus’7 is imposed as a matter of substantive law. It can never shift.8
A further, incorrect usage of the concept is to denote ‘the duty cast upon a
litigant to adduce evidence in order to combat a prima facie case made by his
opponent’.9 In contrast to the overall onus, this is merely a (temporary) duty
or burden to adduce evidence in rebuttal. It could be called an evidential or
evidentiary onus or burden (in Afrikaans, a ‘weerleggingslas’, as opposed to
the true ‘bewyslas’). In practical terms, determining who bears the true onus
in civil matters is relevant when it is as probable that something which is
averred is true as it is probable that it is not true. The probabilities are then
balanced or are ‘50/50’. If this is the position at the end of the case, the party
bearing the burden of proof has failed to discharge it.10
As stated above, a true burden of proof can exist in respect of a claim or a
defence. Thus, while the plaintiff often bears the burden of proof, on the
principle that the party who alleges must prove,11 a defendant may at times
5 Dale Hutchison & Chris-James Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa
2 ed (2012) 179 (contributed by TB Floyd); Tomas Floyd ‘The current debate on the
reversal of the onus of proof when enforcing restraint-of-trade agreements: much ado
about nothing?’ (2012) 75 THRHR 404 at 408–9; Tomas Floyd ‘The constitutional-
ity of the onus of proof when enforcing restraint-of-trade agreements: an appropriate
evaluation of the common-law rules’ (2012) 75 THRHR 521. Also see L T C Harms
Amler’s Precedents of Pleadings (Illegal Contracts) 7 ed (2009) 219.
6 See South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd
1977 (3) SA534 (A) at 548, following Pillay v Krishna 1946AD 946 at 952–3.
7 See Brand v Minister of Justice 1959 (4) SA712 (A) at 715.
8 See Tregea v Godart 1939 AD 16 at 32; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty)
Ltd 2007 (2) SA486 (SCA) para 14.
9 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd supra
note 6 at 548; Mohunram v NDPP (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (4) SA
222 (CC) para 75n99.
10 See D T Zeffertt & A P Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2010) 45.
Total ‘mathematical’ 50/50 probability is rare, but not impossible — it could for
example be indicated by a scientiﬁc study.
11 See parts III(c) and (d) below.
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF 665
bear the burden of proof if such a party raises a special defence.12 If the
probabilities are balanced after such defence is raised, the party who raised the
defence will fail.
Finally, there is the concept of the presumption. Again, conceptual
uncertainty abounds, especially about types of presumption and their impact
on the burden of proof. The impact of the presumption could be to assist in
discharging one party’s onus, to place an evidentiary burden (ie a ‘weerleg-
gingslas’) on the other party, and possibly even to place a full onus on such a
party.13 In the present context, the rebuttable presumption is potentially the
most relevant; it could also be regarded as the only true presumption, in the
sense that it alone involves mandatory inferences or assumptions that require
others to produce evidence to the contrary.14 For example, evidence of
cohabitation and repute, combined with evidence of the marriage ceremony,
give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the parties are validly married; the
party alleging invalidity then has to adduce evidence rebutting this infer-
ence.15 Regulation 44 to the Consumer Protection Act16 in turn contains a
host of terms with certain purposes or effects that are presumed to be unfair,
and hence contravene s 48 of the Act; it is then up to the party seeking
enforcement of these terms to produce evidence that the term is not unfair.
The implications of this brief conceptual overview are as follows. When
Floyd suggests that the party who wishes to rely on illegality bears the burden
of proof of the illegality, he is saying that such a party has to raise a special
defence against a claim for enforcement.17 And when Van der Merwe et al
maintain that the party who seeks to enforce a contract appears to bear the
burden of proof of legality, they in turn regard legality as an essential element
of the claim of enforcement. Inasmuch as it is possible for presumptions to
affect the burden of proof, it can be said that on the Floyd approach, contracts
are presumed to be lawfully concluded, and that the burden of proof rests on
the party denying its validity,18 whereas Van der Merwe et al maintain the
opposite position.
Ultimately, the practical result of these differences is the following. If the
probabilities in regard to proof of the legality of the term are balanced, Van
der Merwe et al will conclude that the party seeking enforcement must fail,
12 See Pillay v Krishna supra note 6 at 952; Intramed (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA
Ltd 2004 (6) SA252 (W) at 259–60; Louw v Golden Arrow Bus Service (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1)
SA218 (LC) para 44; CWHSchmidt Bewysreg 3 ed (1989) 34.
13 D T Zeffertt & A P Paizes Essential Evidence (2010) 56; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit
note 10 at 181.
14 See J du Plessis ‘Presumptions in SouthAfrican law:An historical perspective’ in
R H Helmholz & W David H Sellar (eds) The Law of Presumptions: Essays in Compara-
tive Legal History (2009) 227 at 243.
15 See W v W 1976 (2) SA308 (W) at 315; Ex parte L (also known as A) 1947 (3) SA
50 (C); Ex parte Soobiah In re Estate Pillay 1948 (1) SA 873 (N) at 881; Mudyanduna v
Mukombero 2006 (6) SA185 (ZS) at 190.
16 Act 68 of 2008.
17 See Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 542
18 See W v W supra note 15 at 315.
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whereas to Floyd this lot would befall the party seeking to escape liability. It
has been suggested that such an (exact) equilibrium would be rare,19 but this
remains to be proven. It is at least clear that courts at times pay considerable
attention to which party bears the onus, and that they do not always adopt a
particularly strict approach in ﬁnding that such an equilibrium is present.20 It
must in any event be kept in mind that in motion proceedings for ﬁnal relief
the facts in dispute have to be resolved in favour of the respondent.21 Thus, in
motion proceedings relating to restraint of trade clauses, the respondent is
generally the party seeking to escape liability. If certain facts are in dispute, for
example whether the respondent is acting contrary to the provisions of the
restraint, or whether the applicant has trade secrets or a particular connection
to its clients, these facts have to be resolved in favour of the respondent who
is seeking to escape from the restraint.
One ﬁnal introductory question remains. It is said that the parties bearing
the burden of proof must ﬁnally satisfy the court that they are entitled to
succeed on their claim or defence.22 This still leaves uncertain what the court
must be satisﬁed about. The requirements for claims or defences are set out in
legal rules. These legal rules may in turn require proof of facts to guarantee
success. But sometimes the law sets out the requirements for a claim in terms
that require a value judgement, and not merely proof of facts. Thus, the law
of contract requires that a mistake has to be material and reasonable to render
a contract void. These requirements cannot be met merely by proving facts.
The ﬁnding that a mistake is reasonable may be aided by the proof of facts
(for example that the mistake was caused by the other party’s representation),
but it ultimately remains a (judicial) value judgement. It may be said that the
burden relates to ‘issues’ and not (only) facts. This distinction, which is of
special relevance in debates about the burden of proof in disputes about the
legality of a contract, will be returned to later on.23
III THE GENERAL RULE REGARDING THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IN CASES OF ALLEGED ILLEGALITY
(a) The general rule as revealed by the case law
Against the background of this brief overview of academic views and key
concepts, the relevant case law on who bears the onus when the legality of a
19 See Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 539.
20 See Pratt v First Rand Bank Ltd 2009 (2) SA 119 (SCA) para 13; National Chem-
search (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA1092 (T) at 1102C–D; Brahm du Plessis
& D M Davis ‘Restraint of trade and public policy’ (1984) 86 SALJ 86 at 98–9
(writing in the context of the onus in respect of restraint of trade clauses); Zeffertt &
Paizes op cit note 10 at 55.
21 Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd supra note 8 para 14.
22 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd supra
note 6 at 548, following Pillay v Krishna supra note 6 at 952–3.
23 See part IV(a) below. As to the general uncertainty on whether the onus relates
to ‘facts’or ‘issues’or both, see Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 10 at 60–74 (esp at 69).
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contract is in dispute can now be investigated. In essence, support exists for
the following two propositions.
First, a plaintiff seeking a declaration of invalidity or unenforceability due
to illegality bears the burden of proof.24 The divergence of views discussed
above is not relevant in this case, since the person who seeks relief is also the
person who alleges illegality.
Secondly, if a plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract, but the defendant wants
to escape liability due to illegality, the dominant view in the case law, which
also accords with the approach favoured by Floyd, is that the defendant bears
the burden of proof.25 Thus, in Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh26 Levinsohn J
stated that
‘[t]he legal onus of establishing that a term in a contract (admittedly entered into
by the defendants) is contra bonos mores rests on the defendants. This carries with
it the duty ﬁnally to satisfy the Court that it ought to succeed on the issue and
they have also the duty to adduce evidence in regard to the factual background
relevant to the defence.’
Such a defendant then in effect raises a special defence.27 Special procedural
rules could then govern how the defence should be pleaded and what
evidence should be adduced.28
The two propositions above can be combined in the following rule,
which, for want of a better expression, will be called the ‘general rule’: if the
legality of an agreement is in issue, the party who relies on the illegality bears
24 See eg Pratt v First Rand Bank Ltd supra note 20.
25 See Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh 2004 (3) SA630 (D) 645F–G; F & I Advisors
(Edms) Bpk v Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 1999 (1) SA 515 (SCA);
Koth Property Consultants CC v Lepelle-Nkumpi Local Municipality Ltd 2006 (2) SA 25
(T) para 19; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) at 651; Claasen v African Batignolles
Construction (Pty) Ltd 1954 (1) SA 552 (O) at 556H–557A read with 563B. For a lone
dissenting voice, see the judgment of King J in Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4)
SA325 (W) at 330H, which suggests that the party seeking enforcement also bears the
burden of proof of legality.
26 Diners Club supra note 25 at 645F–G.
27 See Santam Bank Ltd v Voigt 1990 (3) SA 274 (E) at 279F–H; Book v Davidson
supra note 25 at 651. Where a contract may be performed lawfully or unlawfully, the
party seeking avoidance will have to prove that it was intended to perform it unlaw-
fully, and hence is illegal (see Claasen v African Batignolles Construction (Pty) Ltd supra
note 25 at 556H–557A).
28 See Yannakou v Appollo Club 1974 (1) SA614 (A) at 623: ‘Rule 19(4) of the 1968
Magistrates’ Courts’ Rules (like Supreme Court Rule 22(2)) requires of a defendant
that he shall in his plea ‘‘clearly and concisely state the nature of his defence and all the
material facts on which it is based’’. . . . [I]f his [ie the defendant’s] defence is illegality,
which does not appear ex facie the transaction sued on but arises from its surrounding
circumstances, such illegality and the circumstances founding it must be pleaded. It is
true that it is the duty of the Court to take the point of illegality mero motu, even if the
defendant does not plead or raise it; but it can and will only do so if the illegality
appears ex facie the transaction or from the evidence before it.’ The dictum is con-
ﬁrmed in subsequent judgments, for example, ABSA Bank Ltd v Kernsig 17 (Pty) Ltd
2011 (4) SA492 (SCA) para 23.
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the burden of proof.29 One qualiﬁcation must be added to this rule. In cases
of alleged statutory illegality, the statute itself could indicate where the
burden of proof as to whether a contract is legal should be placed.30 Thus, as
Christie explains, a plaintiff seeking enforcement of a type of contract which
by statute is declared to be invalid unless certain requirements are met, bears
the burden of proof that these requirements were met. And if the statute
determines that a type of contract is valid, unless certain exceptional
circumstances prevail, the party seeking to escape liability has to prove the
existence of these circumstances.31
(b) The general rule viewed from a comparative perspective
Having established the general rule on who bears the onus of proof in
disputes over the legality of contracts, we may turn brieﬂy to the question
whether this rule is a peculiarity of the South African law, or whether it also
characterises some prominent jurisdictions that represent traditions which
have been inﬂuential in shaping our law.
In the civil-law context, German law maintains that a party who alleges
that the legal act necessary to conclude a contract is void under § 138 of the
German Civil Code (‘BGB’) bears the burden of proof of the circumstances
that indicate that such an act is contrary to public policy, and hence is
illegal.32 The position in Dutch law is comparable. A party who raises the
defence that a contractual term is unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness under art 6:248 lid 2 of the Dutch Civil Code
must state this defence and must prove it.33
However, it is recognised in civil law that special rules may at times govern
the proof of certain cases of illegality. For example, § 138 of the German Civil
Code does not only contain the general provision in subpara (1) that a legal
transaction which is contrary to public policy is void, but further determines
in subpara (2) that:
‘In particular, voidness attaches to a legal transaction, whereby one person
through exploitation of the situation of distress (Zwangslage), inexperience
(Unerfahrenheit), lack of judgment (Urteilsvermögen) or grave weakness of will
(Willsensschwäche) of another, causes economic advantages to be promised or
granted to himself or to a third party in exchange for a performance, and these
29 See Koth Property Consultants CC v Lepelle-Nkumpi Local Municipality Ltd supra
note 25 para 19; F & I Advisors (Edms) Bpk v Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika
Bpk supra note 25 at 525–26, which by implication supports placing the onus on the
party seeking to escape liability in cases of illegality, although that case concerned the
application of the in duplum rule. Further seeHarms op cit note 5 at 219.
30 See Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Loots 1981 (4) SA260 (T)
at 266C–D; Christie op cit note 3 at 357.
31 See Oosthuizen v Standard Credit Corporation Ltd 1993 (3) SA891 (A) at 905I.
32 Münchener Kommentar zum BGB 6 ed (2012) § 138 paras 155–56 (comment by
Christian Armbrüster); Leo Rosenberg, Karl Heinz Schwab & Peter Gottwald Zivil-
prozessrecht 16 ed (2004) para 101n10.
33 SeeWDHAsser Bewijslastverdeling (2004) para 246 (at 206–8).
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advantages exceed the value of the performance to such an extent that, under
the circumstances, there is a striking disproportion between them.’
Whereas the burden of proof of illegality generally lies on the plaintiff, the
courts to some extent protect such a party when applying subpara (2). Aparty
relying on this provision must prove that the defendant had a reprehensible
motive in exploiting the other party’s weakness. In cases of a particularly
gross discrepancy between the performances, German law then presumes
that this ‘subjective’ requirement of a reprehensible motive was met.34 Thus,
through the operation of special presumptions the application of the general
rule on proof of illegality is modiﬁed.
The approach of placing the onus on the party seeking to escape liability
due to illegality is not limited to the civil law. For example, in the context of
English law, Chitty on Contracts states that the party alleging illegality bears the
burden of proving this fact.35 Similar approaches are also followed in some
American states, which maintain that illegality must be raised as an ‘afﬁrma-
tive defense’ and that the defendants have the burden of pleading and proof of
the defence.36
(c) The justification for the general rule
Given that such strong support exists for the general rule in local and foreign
law, the question arises what considerations could underlie this position. This
demands an investigation into principles or policies that generally inﬂuence
or justify decisions to place the burden of proof in civil matters.37
In Pillay v Krishna38 and Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Mechin39 it was
indicated that three ‘principles’ or ‘rules’ (the terms are used interchangeably)
could be relevant in determining who bears the onus.40
34 MüKoBGB/Armbrüster BGB op cit note 32 § 138 Rn 116, 156. The position-
ing of § 138(2) BGB was not a considered choice. It was the result of a last-minute
attempt in drafting the BGB to accommodate ‘usurious’ agreements concluded by
exploiting weakness; the resulting para 138(2) BGB was then latched onto the general
prohibition of transactions that offend good morals (§ 138(1) BGB) (see J E du Plessis
‘Threats and excessive beneﬁts or unfair advantage’ in Hector L MacQueen & Rein-
hard Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law — Scots and South African Perspectives
(2006) at 160–1). An alternative approach, more in line with model international
instruments aimed at developing the law of contract, could have been to draw a
clearer distinction between illegality (§ 138(1) BGB) on the one hand, and exploiting
weakness as a distinct form of improperly obtained consent, next to misrepresentation/
fraud and duress, on the other (see part IV(c) below).
35 H G Beale (general ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1 General Principles 31 ed (2012)
para 16-207 (at 1352), relying on Hire-Purchase Furnishing Co v Richens (1887) 20
QBD 387 at 389.
36 SamuelWilliston A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 4 ed by RichardALord (2009)
§ 12:5.
37 See generally Floyd 2012 THRHR 521 op cit note 5.
38 Supra note 6 at 951–2.
39 1965 (2) SA706 (A) at 711.
40 Pillay v Krishna supra note 6 at 951–2 and Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Mechin ibid. For comparable principles in English law see Hodge M Malek (general
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The ﬁrst principle is that the party who seeks a remedy must bear the
burden of proof.41 In essence, persons who rely on the courts to determine
that they have a case are expected to prove that they have a case. However, it
has been said that this principle does not imply that the party seeking the
remedy has to adduce proof of circumstances that do not occur ‘ordinarily’.42
Whether the ﬁrst principle could be formulated in this qualiﬁed form is
relevant in the context of disputes over contractual liability. According to the
ﬁrst principle formulated in its qualiﬁed from, the plaintiff seeking the
remedy of enforcement of a contract should not have to bear the burden of
proof in disputes of validity based on rarely occurring circumstances.
Secondly, there is the principle is that a person who pleads a defence is
considered to be the plaintiff for that purpose, and hence bears the burden of
proof of the defence.43 The underlying justiﬁcation for this principle appears
to be that raising a defence is more than a mere denial of a claim; the person
pleading it is in effect making a separate case, which deserves prima facie
substantiation.
The third principle is that the party who makes an allegation, and not the
party who denies it, bears the burden of proof.44 This means that a party is not
normally required to prove a negative.45 It is also regarded as preferable to
place the burden on the party who is in a better position to adduce or obtain
positive proof, or in whose ‘domain’ the facts lie. But this does not necessarily
have to be the one who alleges these facts. Perhaps it is best regarded as a
separate general principle, albeit that it is not expressly endorsed in the Pillay
and Mobil Oil cases.46
These broad principles or rules will at times be in conﬂict.47 They cannot
provide deﬁnitive answers on where the onus should be placed. It is therefore
understandable that some judicial support has been expressed for Wigmore’s
view that the rules about adducing proof and allocating the burden of proof
ultimately are based on ‘broad and undeﬁned reasons of experience and
fairness’.48 Nonetheless, this does not mean that the courts can apply or
ignore these rules at will; in this regard it has been said that it is ‘within these
ed) Phipson on Evidence 17 ed (2010) para 6-06 and for an evaluation see Zeffertt &
Paizes op cit note 10 at 57–61.
41 See D 22.3.21 (‘semper necessitas probandi incumbit illi qui agit’).
42 See J E Goudsmit Pandekten-Systeem vol 1 (1866) § 104 (The Pandects — A
Treatise on the Roman Law tr R deTracy Gould (reproduced 2005) 316–17).
43 See D 44.1.1 (‘agere etiam is videtur, qui exceptione utitur: nam reus in excep-
tione actor est’).
44 See D 22.3.2 (‘ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat’).
45 Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 531.
46 Although Davis AJA may have had this in mind in Pillay when he refers to the
party who is in a better position to provide proof at 955–6 (see Zeffertt & Paizes op cit
note 10 at 59).
47 Zeffertt & Paizes ibid at 58, Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 529.
48 Pillay v Krishna supra note 6 at 953–4; Book v Davidson supra note 25 at 651D–E.
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principles that experience and fairness interplay in the course of doing justice
to the parties’.49
(d) Evaluating the rules on the burden of proof in disputes about validity
Against this brief background on principles that apply in establishing who
should bear the onus of proof, the South African position on who bears the
onus when there is a dispute about legality, and, for purposes of a broader
perspective, on who bears the onus in disputes over other requirements for a
valid contract, can now be evaluated.
We can start with justiﬁcations for the general rule formulated above,
namely that the party who avers illegality must prove it. If this party happens
to be a plaintiff seeking a declaration of invalidity based on illegality, it would
be in accordance with both the ﬁrst principle and third principle to place the
burden of proof on the plaintiff. It would be a fairly straightforward matter to
justify making such a party bear this burden.
However, if a plaintiff seeks enforcement of a contract against a party who
denies liability on the ground that the contract is illegal, the ‘unqualiﬁed’ ﬁrst
principle and third principle are in conﬂict: the ‘unqualiﬁed’ ﬁrst principle
suggests that the party seeking the remedy of enforcement should prove
legality as one of the requirements for validity; this is the plaintiff. The third
principle in turn suggests that the party who positively asserts or alleges
invalidity should prove illegality; this is the defendant. It is only if the ﬁrst
principle is ‘qualiﬁed’ in the way indicated above, ie so as not to cover proof
of rarely occurring or extraordinary circumstances, that the tension between
the ﬁrst and third principles could be resolved: inasmuch as circumstances
indicating illegality are out of the ordinary, the ‘qualiﬁed’ ﬁrst principle
would require that that defendant, and not the plaintiff, has to bear the
burden of proof in disputes about the existence of these circumstances.
This conclusion that it may be preferable for the defendant to bear the
burden of proof is also supported by the second principle: inasmuch as
alleging illegality is more than just a denial, but amounts to a defence (a
distinction which admittedly could be ﬁne),50 the defendant should bear the
burden of proof of this defence. Ultimately, it would therefore appear that a
process of weighing up the three principles tends to support the conclusion
that the burden of proof must be on the party seeking to escape liability on
the grounds of illegality.
One may be forgiven for feeling that this process of weighing up the three
principles is rather technical and abstract. However, it does appear that there
are underlying practical considerations that could justify the conclusion
above that the defendant alleging illegality should bear the burden of proof.
These practical considerations are linked most closely to the ‘qualiﬁed’ ﬁrst
principle, which states that a party seeking a remedy need not prove rarely
49 Book v Davidson ibid at 651D–E. See also the relevance attached to these prin-
ciples in Ensor NO v Rensco Motors (Pty) Ltd 1981 (1) SA815 (A) at 822C.
50 See Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 10 at 58.
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occurring circumstances. If one asks why this should be so, an important
explanation could be that such a party may otherwise have to engage in costly
and potentially wasteful fact-gathering exercises to provide prima facie proof
of facts relating to requirements for validity that may not even be in dispute.
More speciﬁcally it may not generally be expected in claims for enforcement
of contracts that their legality would be in issue.
So far then as to the general principles, and arguments derived from the
law of evidence on how they could impact on placing the burden of proof.
We now turn to an argument more speciﬁc to the law of contract. This is an
argument which the courts have relied on strongly in support of the general
rule which places the onus on the defendant alleging illegality. The argument
is essentially that if a contract has been entered into freely, the contract may
be assumed or expected to be concluded lawfully or to be regarded as prima
facie valid. The implication is that it is up to the party seeking to escape
liability on the ground of illegality to indicate what entitles him or her to such
relief.51 This point was made by Didcott J in Roffey v Catterall, Edwards &
Goudré (Pty) Ltd,52 and expressed as follows in Govender v Naidoo:53
‘[W]hen a person of full age and competent understanding has entered into a
contract, it should be enforced by Courts of justice, and . . . the beneﬁt of any
doubt as to its enforceability must be given against the person seeking to avoid
liability for his solemnly undertaken debt (Fender v St. John-Mildmay, 1938A.C.
1, as applied in Kuhn v Karp, supra . . . [1948 (4) SA825 (T)]).’54
In Kuhn v Karp,55 quoted in Govender above, reference is not only made to
the English Fender case, but also to the famous dictum of Sir George Jessel
MR in Printing Registering Co v Sampson56 that
‘if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice’.
Neither Didcott J in Roffey nor Milne J in Govender expressly stated that the
party denying liability on grounds of illegality bears the burden of proof.
However, this clearly follows from their indication that if the probabilities are
even, the plaintiff seeking enforcement would succeed.
51 See Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA494 (N) 503G–H,
referring to Govender v Naidoo 1959 (2) SA776 (N).Also see the reference in Drewtons
(Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA305 (C) at 313B–C to contracts that have been ‘seriously
concluded’ and the argument of counsel for the appellant in Magna Alloys & Research
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA874 (A) at 879D.
52 Ibid.
53 Supra note 51 at 782D–E.
54 Ibid.
55 Kuhn v Karp 1948 (4) SA825 (T) at 840.
56 LR 19 Eq 462.
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It should be apparent that the cases referred to above ultimately are
inﬂuenced by the familiar maxim of pacta servanda sunt. In this regard the
Constitutional Court held in Barkhuizen v Napier57 that
‘public policy, as informed by the Constitution, requires in general that parties
should comply with contractual obligations that have been freely and volun-
tarily undertaken. This consideration is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt
servanda, which, as the Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly noted, gives
effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-
autonomy, or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own
detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity . . . Pacta sunt
servanda is a profoundly moral principle, on which the coherence of any society
relies. It is also a universally recognised legal principle.’58
It is at this point that we may brieﬂy, and for purposes of a broader
perspective, shift the focus to the problem of where to place the burden of
proof when other requirements for validity are in contention.59 In this regard
it has been held in the context of self-imposed formalities that ‘where the
parties are shown to have been ad idem as to the material conditions of the
contract, the onus of proving an agreement that legal validity should be
postponed until the due execution of a written document, lies on the party
who alleges it’.60 Again, the argument appears to be that once some form of
consensus is proven, the party seeking to challenge it by alleging further
requirements have not been complied with should bear the onus.61 Author-
ity also exists to the effect that a party seeking to escape due to supervening
impossibility of a validly concluded contract bears the burden of proof that
performance has become impossible.62
If we turn to disputes over consensus, the position on placing the burden
of proof is slightly more complex. Here the party seeking enforcement has to
prove that the agreement was aimed at creating binding obligations.63
57 2007 (5) SA323 (CC).
58 Ibid paras 57 and 87.
59 These are essentially that an agreement aimed at creating binding obligations
was concluded by parties, that they had the necessary capacity, that the content of the
contract was certain or capable of being rendered certain, that performance was
possible, that applicable formalities were adhered to, and that the contract was legal.
On typical expositions of the requirements for a valid contract in these terms see J E
du Plessis ‘J C deWet en die struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg’ in J E du
Plessis & G F Lubbe (eds) A Man of Principle — The Life and Legacy of J C de Wet (2013)
137 at 166–7 and 171–88.
60 See Woods v Walters 1921 AD 303 at 305–6; Goldblatt v Freemantle 1920 AD 123
at 128; First National Bank Ltd v Avtjoglou 2000 (1) SA989 (C) at 995E.
61 This argument does not apply in cases governed by statutory formalities; there it
must appear on the face of the pleadings that formalities were complied with (see
Harms op cit note 5 at 113).
62 See Frenkel v Ohlsson’s Cape Breweries Ltd 1909TS 957 at 965–6.
63 Harms op cit note 5 at 110. The plaintiff relying on a written contract must
attach a copy (see Uniform rule 18(6)).A tacit contract must be proved by ‘unequivo-
cal conduct that establishes on a balance of probabilities that the parties intended to,
and did in fact, contract on the terms alleged’ (Harms ibid at 109–10). The burden of
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However, in a number of situations the party who alleges that consent was
absent or defective bears the burden of proof relating to establishing such a
ground for escaping liability. For example, this burden is borne by the party
who maintains that consent is absent due to incapacity,64 or due to a iustus
error (a material and reasonable mistake).65 Judicial support exists for a similar
approach to placing the onus if consent has been obtained in an improper
manner. Here the burden of proof is on the party alleging defects such as
fraud66 or duress.67
This general allocation of the burden of proof is also in accordance with
positions adopted in some leading foreign jurisdictions. German law places
the burden of proof of a variety of problems with consent on the party
alleging their existence. These include problems with incapacity as well as
cases where the declaration of will has been rescinded due to mistake (under
§ 119 BGB), fraud or duress (under § 123 BGB).68 Again one ﬁnds, as
Wigmore indicated, that considerations of fairness or reasonableness must
underlie the allocation of the burden.69 An inﬂuential general principle in
German law is that the defendant bears the burden of proof of the elements
that stand in the way of, destroy or inhibit the plaintiff’s claim, such as the
existence of defective consent.70 Dutch law also does not require that a party
who seeks enforcement of a contract has to bear the burden of proof of all the
requirements for a valid contract.Aparty who alleges a defect in consent such
proof of the party seeking enforcement extends to the validity of all its terms. This
includes proving a negative, namely the absence of terms which the other party
alleges are part of the contract (see Stocks & Stocks (Pty) Ltd v TJ Daly & Sons (Pty) Ltd
1979 (3) SA754 (A)).
64 Serobe v Koppies Bantu Community School Board 1958 (2) SA (O) 265 at 271 (in
turn referring to J W Wessels Contract 2 ed vol 1 (1951) para 693 and Voet Commen-
tarius ad Pandectas 4.4.12); Di Giulio v First National Bank of SA Ltd 2002 (6) SA 281
(C) para 28.
65 See, for example, the judgment of OlivierAJ in Rosherville Vehicle Services (Edms)
Bpk v Bloemfonteinse Plaaslike Oorgangsraad 1998 (2) SA 289 (O) at 296, which in the
context of an allegation of unilateral mistake, relies on George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd
1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 472A; National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v
Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A) at 479G–H. Olivier AJ further suggested that a
contrary position is followed in Diedericks v Minister of Lands 1964 (1) SA 49 (N) at
54F–55A and in Saambou National Building Society v Friedman 1977 (3) SA 268 (W) at
275F–H, but this is not apparent from the passage quoted from these two cases. On
placing the burden of proof on a party alleging that an agreement is a simulation see
Niemand v Van Heerden [1998] 3All SA616 (NC) at 619–21.
66 Di Giulio v First National Bank of SA Ltd supra note 64 para 28; African Dawn
Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA)
para 30.
67 See Savvides v Savvides 1986 (2) SA325 (T) at 330.
68 Rosenberg et al op cit note 32 para 101 Rn 10–12; Hans-Joachim Musielak
Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung 7 ed (2009) § 286 para 51.
69 H Prütting Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO 4 ed (2013) § 285 para 108.
70 Prütting ibid § 285 para 111; Musielak op cit note 68 § 286 para 36. Further see
Schmidt op cit note 12 at 37.
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as mistake or fraud bears the burden of proof of this defect, admittedly with
rather detailed provisions on the extent of such a burden.71
A similar approach is adopted in English law, which maintains that the
defendant bears the onus of facts pleaded in confession and avoidance, such as
infancy, rescission and fraud.72 If the claimant shows that parties concluded
an express agreement, the defendant seeking to escape liability on the basis
that there was no intention to create legal relations bears the onus of proving
the absence of such an intention.73 However, English law does recognise
certain speciﬁc rules that make it easier for a party who alleges that consent
was obtained in an improper manner to succeed in proving this. Thus, in the
case of undue inﬂuence certain presumptions facilitate the burden of proof.
This point will be returned to later on.74
What could justify this general approach, adopted in a number of
prominent jurisdictions, of placing the burden of proof on the party seeking
to escape liability due to problems with consent? We have seen that the pacta
servanda sunt justiﬁcation plays a prominent role in supporting the general
rule that the party alleging illegality bears the burden of proof. But this
justiﬁcation runs into difﬁculties when we have to decide who bears the
burden of proof in disputes about whether there was consent: the pacta
servanda sunt justiﬁcation assumes that consent has been given freely and
voluntarily, whereas it is precisely the existence of consent which is in
dispute. However, another, familiar justiﬁcation could be more relevant. As
we have seen, some of the principles of the law of evidence on who should
bear the burden of proof essentially protect parties who seek enforcement
from having to provide prima facie proof of proof of rarely occurring or
extraordinary circumstances. It can then be argued that it is not normally
expected that parties would place the existence of consent in dispute (just as it
is also not expected that legality would be in contention). To require in each
and every case where a plaintiff seeks enforcement that he or she must
provide prima facie proof that none of the possible defects of consent are
present could be costly and wasteful if the defendant never intended placing
these requirements in dispute.75
Let us recap. It has been shown that where a party alleges that a
requirement for the validity of a contract, and more speciﬁcally the legality
requirement, has not been met, such a party generally bears the burden of
proof to establish invalidity. It has also been shown that this position could be
justiﬁed with reference to a variety of principles. We now turn to consider
the implications of these ﬁndings for one of the most contentious problem
areas in the SouthAfrican law of contract, and certainly the most contentious
71 SeeAsser op cit note 33 para 241.
72 SeeMalek op cit note 40 para 6-08.
73 See Beale op cit note 35 para 2-162.
74 See part IV(c) below.
75 Also see Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 530.
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in the context of the legality requirement. This is the problem of who should
bear the burden of proof in disputes about the validity of a restraint of trade
clause.
IV THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE
CLAUSES76
(a) Restraint of trade clauses and the general rule
Under English inﬂuence, South African law has for many years acknow-
ledged an exception to the general rule above that the party who alleges
illegality must prove it.77 The exception was that the plaintiff seeking
enforcement of a restraint of trade clause bore the burden of proof of its
legality.78 However, three decades ago the Appellate Division changed this
position in Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis.79 Since this
decision, the restraint of trade clause has to be treated in the same manner as
any other clause whose legality is in dispute. This means that the general rule
applies — the party alleging that the enforcement of the restraint would be
contrary to public interest (and hence that it is illegal), bears the burden of
proof.80 Thus, if the plaintiff seeks a declaration of invalidity, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof that enforcing the restraint would be contrary to
public interest.81 But if the plaintiff seeks enforcement of the restraint, he or
she (merely) has to prove the agreement itself and breach; it is the defendant
who bears the burden of proof that enforcement would be contrary to the
public interest.82
Since Magna Alloys, some academics and members of the judiciary have
argued strongly in favour of reverting to the previous position by shifting the
onus on the party seeking to enforce the restraint. In other words, they have
argued that restraints of trade should be an exception to the general rule. In
the next section it will be considered whether such a development could be
justiﬁed, especially in the light of the preceding exposition of general
76 For an in-depth recent analysis see Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 4 at 404 and
521.
77 For the background to the reception of the English rule, see Philippus J Suther-
land The Restraint of Trade Doctrine in England, Scotland and South Africa (PhD thesis,
University of Edinburgh, 1997) 254–6; Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 405ff.
78 See Sutherland ibid at 254–6 and for critical views compare Roffey v Catterall,
Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd supra note 51 at 503G–H; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban
Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA777 (D) at 787–8.
79 Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis supra note 51.
80 Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd supra note 8; Magna Alloys &
Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis supra note 51 at 892I–893A.
81 See Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA
306 (SCA) para 13.
82 Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA742 (A) at 777H–I; Experian South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Haynes 2013 (1) SA 135 (GSJ) para 14; Mozart Ice Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff
2009 (3) SA 78 (C) at 82D; Dickinson Holdings (Group) (Pty) Ltd v Du Plessis 2008 (4)
SA214 (N) para 85; Harms op cit note 5 at 343.
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principles. But before doing so, it must be pointed out that a number of
commentators have remarked that the practical implications of placing the
onus on the restrained party are in any event limited. Certain procedural and
evidentiary considerations may render it distinctly unwise for the plaintiff
seeking enforcement to adopt a relaxed approach to adducing proof as to
legality merely because the restrained party bears the burden of proof.
The ﬁrst consideration has already been encountered. In motion proceed-
ings the facts in dispute have to be resolved in favour of the respondent, who
usually is the restrained party. The second consideration deals with a question
posed at the outset, but not yet considered, namely what exactly the burden
of proof relates to. The Supreme Court of Appeal has now indicated that the
burden of proof in restraint cases only relates to the facts. It does not extend to
the value judgement whether, in the light of the facts, it would be reasonable to
enforce the restraint. According to Malan AJA in Reddy v Siemens Telecommu-
nications (Pty) Ltd:83
‘If the facts disclosed in the afﬁdavits, assessed in the manner that I have
described, disclose that the restraint is reasonable, then Siemens must succeed:
if, on the other hand, those facts disclose that the restraint is unreasonable then
Reddy must succeed. What that calls for is a value judgment, rather than a
determination of what facts have been proved, and the incidence of the onus
accordingly plays no role.’ 84
Similar views have also been expressed by South African authors,85 and in
foreign law. For example, Treitel has remarked in the context of English law
that
‘the questions of reasonableness and public interest are questions of law so that it
is strictly inaccurate to say that the party claiming enforcement has the onus of
proving that the covenant is reasonable. What he must do is prove the
circumstances from which the court may conclude that the ratio between
restraint and interest is reasonable. The same principle applies to the question of
public interest.’86
This point was clearly conveyed by Lord Parker of Waddington in Herbert
Morris Ltd v Saxelby:
83 Supra note 8.
84 Ibid para 14. But see the judgment of Botha JA in Basson v Chilwan supra note 82
at 776–7, where it is said that ‘the covenantee seeking to enforce the restraint need do
no more than to invoke the provisions of the contract and prove the breach; the
covenantor seeking to avert enforcement is required to prove on a preponderance of
probability that in all the circumstances of the particular case it will be unreasonable to
enforce the restraint; if the Court is unable to make up its mind on the point, the
restraint will be enforced’. But this leaves open the question whether ‘the point’ is the
underlying facts or the issue of reasonableness.
85 See Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 10 at 70n60.
86 G H Treitel The Law of Contract 13 ed by Edwin Peel (2011) para 11-085 (at
516).
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‘When once they [i e the circumstances] are proved it is a question of law for
the decision of the judge whether they do or not justify the restraint. There is
no question of onus one way or another.’87
All in all, the party seeking enforcement therefore should not ﬁnd too much
comfort in the burden of proof being on the restrained party. The party
seeking enforcement clearly has no choice but to argue why in the light of
the proven facts the court must ﬁnd that the restraint is reasonable. In this
regard it would be especially important to place facts before the court which
show that interests such as the need to protect conﬁdential information or
client connections outweigh any interest on the side of the restrained party in
being economically active.88
(b) Justifications for applying the general rule to restraint of trade clauses
It has been shown earlier that South African law generally maintains that
once a party seeking enforcement of a contract or term proves actual
consensus, or at least the appearance of consensus, it is up to the defendant
seeking to escape liability to prove that a speciﬁc requirement for contractual
validity has not been met. It was also shown that the courts have especially
emphasised the pacta servanda sunt principle in adopting this position, and
that it is supported by the practical consideration of preventing unnecessary
costs if the person seeking enforcement were to be compelled to present
evidence about requirements for liability that may not be in dispute.89
The question now arises whether there are special considerations that
justify treating the incidence of the onus differently in restraint of trade cases.
The dominant view in the case law on this point is clear. It was said in Magna
Alloys that it is ‘illogical and inappropriate’ to place the onus on the party
seeking enforcement ‘when the point of departure is that agreements have to
be enforced unless it is proved that their enforcement would harm the public
interest’.90 This justiﬁcation was repeated by Botha JA in Basson v Chilwan:91
‘The covenantor is burdened with the onus because public policy requires
that people should be bound by their contractual undertakings.’92 In
deciding where to place the burden of proof in restraint of trade clauses, the
courts therefore clearly attach great weight to the pacta servanda sunt
principle.
As far as justiﬁcations are concerned for adopting the contrary position, ie
that the burden of proof should be placed on the party seeking enforcement
87 [1916] 1AC 688 at 707; further seeAlbert Kiralfy The Burden of Proof (1987) 94.
88 The third question in Basson v Chilwan supra note 82.
89 See Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 530.
90 Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis supra note 51 at 893A–E. For a
similar argument see Arthur Suzman QC ‘Book Review — O D Schreiner The
Contribution of English Law to South African Law’ (1968) 85 SALJ 90 at 91; further see
Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 407–8.
91 Supra note 82.
92 Basson v Chilwan ibid at 777A.
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of the restraint,93 the focus has especially been on s 22 of the Constitution.94
This section protects a person’s right to choose his or her trade, occupation or
profession. The argument is essentially that a restraint of trade clause limits or
infringes this right, and that the burden of proof of its enforceability must
therefore rest on the party seeking enforcement.95
Thus far this argument has not enjoyed signiﬁcant judicial support. It
indeed cannot be denied that a person’s choice of trade, occupation or
profession would be limited by enforcing a restraint of trade clause. But the
mere limitation of such a right does not imply that the burden of proof of
validity necessarily has to be placed on the party seeking enforcement.96 To
succeed, the argument requires proper engagement with the basic principles
that generally govern allocating the burden of proof97 and with the
constitutional rights and values that could underpin these principles.98 In this
regard it is signiﬁcant that the pacta servanda sunt principle, relied on in
placing the onus of proving illegality on the party alleging it, (also) enjoys
constitutional recognition. More speciﬁcally, if it appears that both parties
have exercised their autonomy by agreeing to the clause, it can be said that
they have given expression to their right of dignity, which is entrenched in
93 The focus here is on who bears the onus when full enforcement is sought. If
partial enforcement is sought, the justiﬁcation for applying the general rule loses
force, inasmuch as the party seeking partial enforcement is trying to hold the party to
something other than that which was agreed upon. This may warrant placing the
burden of proof on the party seeking partial enforcement to show why this ‘scaled
down’ consensus should be enforced. For a discussion of approaches to the onus in
cases of partial enforcement further see Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 540–2.
94 Constitution of theRepublic of SouthAfrica, 1996.
95 See, for example, Canon KwaZulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Office Automation v
Booth 2005 (3) SA 205 (N) at 209E–F: ‘The restraint of trade clause in the contract
constitutes a limitation on ﬁrst respondent’s fundamental right to freedom of trade,
occupation and profession. It is inconsistent with the Constitution to impose the onus
to prove a constitutional protection on the ﬁrst respondent.’ For a fuller treatment see
Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 413ff.
96 This point is not for example argued in Canon KwaZulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd t/a
Canon Office Automation v Booth ibid at 209 or in Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a
Fidelity Guards v Pearmain 2002 (2) SA853 (SE) at 862 (it merely was stated obiter that
‘it seems that the position in terms of the Constitution may now be that the onus will
be on the party wishing to enforce it to show that it complies with the provisions of
the Constitution. For purposes of this judgment I do not ﬁnd it necessary to deter-
mine this question . . .’). Also see C-J Pretorius ‘Covenants in restraint of trade: An
evaluation of the positive law’ (1997) 60 THRHR 6 at 24; Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit
note 5 at 413ff.
97 See generally Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5.
98 For example, it might be argued that because the facts in dispute are generally
within the domain of the party seeking enforcement, rather than of the party seeking
to escape liability, the former should bear the onus. But the notion that a party must
provide proof of factual material peculiarly within his or her knowledge is not with-
out its difﬁculties (see Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 10 at 91–2, especially note 152).
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s 10 of the Constitution.99 Furthermore, recognition is in any event already
given to a party’s s 22 rights through the rule that the interest of the restricted
party not to be economically inactive or unproductive is an important
consideration in determining the reasonableness of a restraint of trade clause,
and hence in determining its enforceability.100
The judgment of the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier101
further presents a particularly formidable obstacle to the view that the onus
must be on the party seeking to enforce the restraint. In that case the validity
of a term which restricted a party’s right to access to the courts (a right
protected by s 34 of the Constitution) was in dispute. The Constitutional
Court, in accordance with the general rule, placed the onus on the party
seeking to avoid enforcement to prove that it was unreasonable and contrary
to public policy.102 The mere fact that a potential infringement of a particular
constitutional right was at stake was not sufﬁcient to warrant any reversal of
the onus. The court further recognised the rule that a party seeking to invoke
the limitations clause of the Bill Rights (s 36(1)) bears the onus of proving
that the limitation of a fundamental right is permissible in terms of this
clause,103 but it clearly stated that this rule only applies to laws of general
application, and not to contractual terms.104 The court in Barkhuizen
therefore drew a clear line through those cases which relied on the allocation
of the onus under s 36(1) as justiﬁcation for placing the onus in restraints of
trade on the party seeking to enforce a term that limits a constitutional right
(eg s 22).105
99 See Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd supra note 8 para 15; Mark Tait
‘Who should bear the onus in restraint of trade disputes?’ (2004) 25 Obiter 488; Floyd
2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 416. Reference has been made to the right to equality,
protected by s 9(1) of the Constitution, in order to challenge the position that the
party seeking enforcement must bear the burden of proof. According to Floyd, the
right to equality implies that the onus of proof should be divided between the parties,
unless there is a reason not to do so (2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at 419–20 and
525–6, referring to Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) and Khumalo v
Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC)). At 526 he suggests that there should be an ‘equal’
division of the burden of proof, unless there is a reason not to do so, and at 528 he
states that the sharing of the burden of proof ‘need not be entirely equal’. However, it
is not apparent why the recognition of a right to equal treatment implies that as a
point of departure the burden of proof must be (equally) shared by the parties. The
Prinsloo and Khumalo cases only require a division of the onus that is justiﬁable or
rational, and not arbitrary or discriminatory (see for example Prinsloo ibid paras 36 and
38).
100 See Basson v Chilwan supra note 82 at 767G.
101 Supra note 57 para 23.
102 Ibid para 58.
103 See, for example, Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial
1999 (2) SA471 (C) para 28; De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA785 (CC) para 92; S v
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 102, Floyd 2012 THRHR op cit note 5 at
416.
104 Supra note 57 para 23.
105 See, for example, Coetzee v Comitis 2001 (1) SA1254 (C) para 40.
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It further does not appear that there are particularly promising routes to get
around Barkhuizen. One route is perhaps to argue that the general rule itself is
unconstitutional, but, as indicated earlier, this rule could be justiﬁed by a
variety of considerations of principle and policy. Alternatively, it could be
argued that the onus must exceptionally be placed on the party seeking
enforcement of a term that could restrict s 22 rights, but not be placed on the
party to escape enforcement of a term that could restrict s 34 rights.
However, it is hardly apparent what the justiﬁcation could be for such a
differentiated and potentially discriminatory treatment of allocating the
burden of proof. It would mean that a private individual who concluded a
contract of insurance which limits the right of access to the courts should be
in a signiﬁcantly worse position as regards the allocation of the onus than a
business executive who concluded an employment contract restricting his
right to choose his trade or profession. In short, it cannot be concluded that
the onus has to be on the party seeking enforcement merely by pointing out
that the restrained party enjoys a speciﬁc constitutional right, without
explaining why such an exceptional position is tenable.
A second justiﬁcation for placing the onus on the party seeking to enforce
the restraint has featured prominently in the context of the employment
relationship. In essence, it is maintained that the onus should be on the
employer seeking enforcement due to the inequality or bargaining power of
employees.106 However, here we face the problem of over-generalisation.
Prospective employees may indeed at times be in a weaker bargaining
position than prospective employers.107 But restraint of trade clauses are also
often signed by executives for whom this need not hold true. And if
inequality could generally be assumed in employment contract restraints,
why not do so in a host of consumer contracts where the inequality may have
been even more readily apparent? The difﬁculty therefore arises as in
pre-Magna Alloys English law: an inconsistent exception based on the notion
that restraints of trade are to be viewed with particular suspicion due to an
assumed inequality of bargaining power.108
(c) Alternative routes to contractual equity: Developing effective ways to combat
improperly obtained consent
It was argued above that no proper case has been made out for departing from
the general rule through exceptionally placing the onus in restraint of trade
cases on the party seeking to enforce the restraint, rather than on the party
seeking to escape liability. Such a case cannot merely be based on an
106 See Karin Calitz ‘Restraint of trade agreements in employment contracts: time
for pacta servanda sunt to bow out?’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 50.
107 See Zero Model Management (Pty) Ltd v Barnard 2010 JDR 0842 (WCC) at 29.
108 See Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd supra note 51 at 499–500;
Basson v Chilwan supra note 82 at 777C (per Botha JA); Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v
Minnitt 1979 (3) SA99 (C) at 402H–403A; Sutherland op cit note 77 at 259.
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assumption that parties concluding an employment contract are necessarily in
such an unequal situation that the onus must be placed on the employer.
However, arguments regarding the onus should not deﬂect our attention
from a more serious underlying problem in our law of contract. We have
seen that the pacta servanda sunt principle requires that freely concluded
agreements should generally be enforced, and that this principle is resorted to
in order to justify placing the onus on the party seeking to escape liability due
to illegality.109 But for this principle to have persuasive force, it is crucial that
our law on when consent itself is freely given has to function properly. Or, to
put the point differently, if there are cases where consent has not been given
freely, but the existing law fails to provide the necessary relief, then it calls
into question applying the principle of pacta servanda sunt. As Davis J
pointed out in Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel v
Kuhn,110 there is a need for sensitivity to the position contracting parties ﬁnd
themselves in when (supposedly) exercising their freedom of contract or
contractual autonomy. It is now necessary to turn to the question whether
there are such cases, and if so, what our law could do about them.
In this regard a matter of particular concern is the way in which the South
African common law currently treats cases where there is not only weakness
on the side of one party, but this weakness is exploited by the other party to
obtain ‘assent’ to an onerous contract. The conventional approach is that the
only improper ways of obtaining consent that warrant relief are misrepresen-
tation, duress, undue inﬂuence and exceptional cases like commercial
bribery. However, developments in contract law globally indicate that such
an approach does not go far enough. The mere fact that the parties are in a
position of relative weakness or an unequal bargaining position can indeed
not be sufﬁcient in itself to inﬂuence the validity of the contract.111 As
indicated earlier, it can at best be a factor that could be taken into account
with others (such as the lack of a protectable interest in the context of the
restraint of trade clause) in determining whether a contract or term is
109 See Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57, discussed in part III(d) above.
110 2008 (2) SA375 (C) para 30; Mozart Ice Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff supra
note 82 at 85. Also see the judgment of Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57
para 168, quoting the statement of the Hong Kong Law Commission that ‘The
principle of sanctity of contract carries conviction only if there is a contract in the
sense of a full-hearted agreement which is the result of free and equal bargaining’. The
judgment of Wallis AJ (as he then was) in Den Braven SA (Pty) Ltd v Pillay 2008 (6) SA
229 (D) does not appear to reject this general position; however, he clearly is more
guarded about the mechanism that could be used to counteract problems arising from
what he calls ‘the disparate power relationships of the parties’ (para 33).
111 See Robert Sharrock ‘Relative bargaining strength and illegality: Uniting
Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (5) SA 205
(WCC)’ (2014) 35 Obiter 136 at 141–4; Jaco Barnard-Naudé ‘Of Dorothy’s dog,
‘‘poststructural’’ fairy tales . . . and the real: Power, poverty and the general principles
of the South African law of contract’ (2013) 29 SAJHR 467 at 479. In Uniting
Reformed Church, De Doorns the court emphasised inequality, rather than the need to
prove that advantage was taken in an improper manner.
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF 683
contrary to public policy, and hence illegal.112 But the possibility has not
been properly explored whether the exploitation or abuse of situations of
weakness such as inequality of bargaining power could be an independent
ground for relief, or a further improper way of obtaining consent, apart from
established grounds like misrepresentation, duress and undue inﬂuence.
In this regard some notable developments have already taken place in
statutory consumer law. More speciﬁcally, s 40 of the Consumer Protection
Act 68 of 2008 broadened the ambit of cases where weak consumers will be
protected.113 This provision does not only prohibit the conventional
improper means of obtaining consent referred to above, but also includes the
situation where a supplier knowingly takes advantage of the fact that a
consumer was substantially unable to protect his or her own interest because
of various forms of weakness. These include disability, ignorance, and an
inability to understand the language of the agreement. While this provision is
restricted to consumer contracts in our law, the general trend in international
instruments aimed at harmonising contract law has been to extend this type
of protection to a variety of contracts. According to these instruments, the
types of weakness which may not be exploited to obtain an unfair advantage
typically include dependence, economic distress, urgent needs, improvi-
dence, ignorance, inexperience and lack of bargaining skill. It is at times
further required that the party taking advantage either had to know or should
have known of the weakness.114
112 See Basson v Chilwan supra note 82 at 777C; Reeves v Marfield Insurance Brokers
CC 1996 (3) SA 766 (SCA) at 776E–F and Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57, which
recognises more generally that inequality can also be taken into account when deter-
mining whether contractual terms or their enforcement would be unreasonable, and
hence contrary to public policy.
113 Section 40(1) provides that ‘A supplier or an agent of the supplier must not use
physical force against a consumer, coercion, undue inﬂuence, pressure, duress or
harassment, unfair tactics or any other similar conduct, in connection with [inter alia]
the conclusion or enforcement of an agreement to supply any goods or services to a
consumer.’ Section 40(2) then proceeds to state: ‘In addition to any conduct contem-
plated in subsection (1), it is unconscionable for a supplier knowingly to take advan-
tage of the fact that a consumer was substantially unable to protect the consumer’s
own interests because of physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability to
understand the language of an agreement, or any other similar factor.’ For comment
see Graham Glover ‘Section 40 of the Consumer Protection Act in comparative
perspective’ 2013 TSAR 689; Jacques du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against
unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’
(2012) 75 THRHR 26. Further see s 52(2)(b), which requires of courts, when dealing
with alleged contraventions of ss 40, 41 or 48, to consider the relationship between
the parties and their relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bar-
gaining position.
114 See art 3.2.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(for comment on its predecessor, art 3.10, see J E du Plessis & P Huber ‘Chapter 3:
Validity’ in StefanVogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp Commentary on the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) (2009) 449–56);Art 4:109 of the
Principles of European Contract Law (for comment see Du Plessis in MacQueen &
Zimmermann (eds) op cit note 34 at 158–71); Art II.-2:207 of the Draft Common
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Ultimately, we are therefore presented with a range of principles that
could assist us in determining when consent truly has been obtained properly
or has been provided freely.115 The challenge facing South African common
law, if there is a serious conviction that only freely agreed-upon contracts
should be enforced, is to consider extending the traditional categories of
improperly obtained consent to meet modern demands.116 A failure to do so
would subvert the pacta servanda sunt principle itself, for its whole founda-
tion is the notion that the contract has to be a true expression of the parties’
free will.117
Crucially, it is not necessary to invent entirely new legal concepts to
achieve this goal.118 We already have the conceptual apparatus to do so. To
facilitate the recognition of undue inﬂuence as a further ground for
invalidating a contract, the Appellate Division in Preller v Jordaan119 creatively
made use of the earlier civil law on dolus, which could cover a variety of
improper ways of obtaining consent to conclude detrimental contracts. This
type of approach could also be adopted to recognise a further speciﬁc ground
for relief, covering cases that do not fall under the traditional grounds like
misrepresentation, duress, and undue inﬂuence.120 While its precise ambit
remains to be ‘hammered out on the anvil of concrete cases’,121 this new
Frame of Reference (DCFR) andArt 51 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) 2011/0284OM (for comment
see L Hawthorne ‘Concretising the open norm of public policy: Inequality of bar-
gaining power and exploitation’ (2014) 77 THRHR 407 at 418–24). Further see the
observations of F D J Brand ‘The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South
African law of contract: The inﬂuence of the common law and the Constitution’
(2009) 126 SALJ 71 at 88–9, reﬂecting a willingness to provide relief where the
bargaining position of the parties was so unequal that the victim in effect had no say at
all.
115 See, for example, the judgments of Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57
at para 173 and Moseneke J at para 108, as well as Van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at
114–15.
116 See, for example, the American decision of Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company 350 F 2d 445 (CADC 1965).
117 See Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 (4) SA500 (GNP) para 24.
118 On the potential role of the judiciary in promoting contractual equity by devel-
oping the existing conceptual apparatus, see the 2014 Morti Malherbe Memorial
Lecture by D M Davis (‘Where is the map to guide common-law development?’
(2014) 25 Stellenbosch LR 3).
119 1956 (1) SA483 (A) at 489–93.
120 This incremental development might be preferable to subsuming all existing
and new speciﬁc grounds under ‘improperly obtained consent’ as a general ground for
rescission. This rather vague notion has not gained notable support. In BOE Bank Bpk
v Van Zyl 2002 (5) SA 165 (C), Brand J (as he then was) was not prepared to endorse
such a development (para 65); see further Graham Glover ‘Contract, good faith, the
Constitution and duress: Contextualising the doctrine’ in G B Glover (ed) Essays in
Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 101 at 118–19.
121 To use the phrase coined by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in another context in
Her Majesty’s Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1AC 268. On recognising new cases see
further D J Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 118; Van der Merwe
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speciﬁc ground could cover a variety of situations where weakness is present,
combined with unacceptable advantage-taking by a party who knew or
should have known about it.
To facilitate this development our courts could further resort to the
principle of good faith or bona ﬁdes — not as a ‘free-ﬂoating’ principle to
refuse to enforce contracts at will — but as an underlying value of our law of
contract, which historically has played the important ‘midwife’ function of
facilitating the birth of speciﬁc constructs and rules which promote the
mutual regard that parties to a contract have to display to each other.122
Finally, any development of the common law aimed at ensuring that consent
must be provided freely could potentially be justiﬁed on the basis that greater
effect would thereby be given to a party’s autonomy; this in turn could give
expression to and reinforce the constitutional right and values of freedom and
dignity.123
We have to some extent departed from the main question of burden of
proof. But the point had to be made that it may be preferable to strike at the
heart of problems relating to the exploitation of weakness rather than
(merely) to refer to these problems in order to justify exceptionally placing
the onus of proof of validity on the employer when an employee agrees to a
restraint of trade clause. We can now, in conclusion, return to the issue of the
burden of proof, and ask how it is to be allocated if, as argued above, the
existing categories of improperly obtained consent were to be extended to
cover new cases of exploitation of weakness.
et al op cit note 4 at 110–15; Hutchison & Pretorius op cit note 5 at 144; L Haw-
thorne ‘Public policy and micro lending — has the unruly horse died?’ (2003) 66
THRHR 116 at 122; LHawthorne op cit note 114. Hawthorne favours the develop-
ment taking place within the ambit of the requirement that contracts must not be
contrary to public policy. However, even though inequality may be relevant when
applying this requirement (as indicated in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA
21 (SCA) para [12]; Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57 paras 59 and 66), the develop-
ment argued for here is the express recognition of a separate ground of improperly
obtained consent, next to others such as undue inﬂuence. For criticism of a conﬂation
of the requirement that contracts may not be contrary to public policy and the proce-
dural requirement that certain means should not be used to obtain consent further see
Gerhard Lubbe ‘Bona ﬁdes, billikheid en die openbare belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse
kontraktereg’ (1990) 1 Stellenbosch LR 7 at 22–3.
122 See Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57 para 82; Brand op cit note 114 at 83; Dale
Hutchison ‘Good faith in the South African law of contract’ in Roger Brownsword,
Norma J Hird & Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context
(1999) 213 at 229–42; Reinhard Zimmermann ‘Good Faith and equity’ in Reinhard
Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross — Civil Law and Common Law in
South Africa (1996) 217; Glover op cit note 120 at 114–15.
123 See Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 57 para 57; Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking funda-
mental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications for the development of
contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395 at 420–23; Brand supra note 114 at 86–9 (espe-
cially the text to note 77, reﬂecting a reconsideration of earlier positions, and endors-
ing Lubbe’s views on the varied roles that values like freedom and dignity could play);
Glover op cit note 120 at 119–27; Sharrock op cit note 111 at 143.
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In this regard it has been indicated that the general approach of South
African law is that if the party seeking enforcement has proven actual or
apparent consent, the party seeking to escape liability bears the onus of proof
that a requirement for liability has not been met. This also includes
requirements relating to whether consent has been freely given.124 However,
it may be difﬁcult to prove that consent was not given freely where parties are
in an unequal relationship. This problem has long been recognised in English
law. Like SouthAfrican law, it places the burden of proof of undue inﬂuence
on the person seeking to escape liability. This position is also in line with the
general rule. But English law further recognises that at times it may be
difﬁcult to discharge a burden of proof of such a defect of consent. In this
regard English law maintains that the burden is normally discharged if the
person seeking to escape liability can prove two things: ﬁrst, that he or she
placed trust and conﬁdence in the other party; and secondly, that the
transaction calls for explanation.125 When such proof is provided, it is up to
the party seeking enforcement to prove that the transaction was nonetheless
freely concluded. Resorting to presumptions could be a subtle instrument to
protect such parties, compared to the somewhat unsophisticated tool of an
anomalous exception, whereby the onus is simply shifted to the party seeking
enforcement of a particular type of contract, namely that of employment.
The practice of using presumptions to protect weak parties is not without
precedent in the civil-law tradition, of which SouthAfrican law forms a part.
As in later English law, the earlier civil law at times eased the burden of proof
of a defect of consent by making use of presumptions. For example, where a
contract was challenged on the ground of duress (metus), the victim had to
prove that he or she acted under fear. But because proof of fear was difﬁcult,
proof could be facilitated by a presumption that fear arose in certain typical
situations of intimidation.126 The potential exists in our modern law to draw
on this early practice, and use devices like presumptions to facilitate proof of
improperly obtained consent. This practice would also be in line with the
approach of modern German law, which, as we have seen earlier, uses
presumptions to prove the state if mind of the victim in applying § 138(2)
BGB.127
Again, the courts will have to proceed incrementally to make proper use of
this conceptual tool. The mere fact that parties concluded an employment
contract cannot be the basis for a presumption that advantage has been taken
124 See part III(d) above.
125 See eg Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2AC 773 para 14.
126 See J du Plessis & R Zimmermann ‘The relevance of reverence: Undue inﬂu-
ence civilian style’ (2003) 10 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 345 at
354–7, discussing the views of earlier civil-law authors such as Joseph Mascardus and
Jacobus Menochius (for reference to their works in modern SouthAfrican law see eg
Wright v Westelike Provinsie Kelders Bpk 2001 (4) SA 1165 (C) para 35 and Radley v
Stopforth 1977 (2) SA516 (A) at 528).
127 See part III(b) above; MüKoBGB/Armbrüster BGB op cit note 32 § 138 para
116.
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of weakness. However, a presumption that consent was not properly
obtained, and more speciﬁcally that advantage was taken of weakness, would
be more tenable if there is an indication that a party was in a situation of
economic distress, with no alternative avenue of employment, and the other
party insisted on onerous terms when it knew about this state of affairs.
Developing presumptions like these will undoubtedly require a certain
degree of boldness from the courts. But if our common law is to remain
resilient and responsive to the constantly adapting needs of society, and
especially to the need for a more equitable law of contract that promotes and
balances the interests of both parties, there may be no real alternative.
V CONCLUSIONS
SouthAfrican law adheres to a general rule that if the legality of an agreement
is in issue, the party who relies on the illegality bears the burden of proof.
Our system is not alone in this regard; such a general rule is standard practice
in a number of prominent jurisdictions. A similar approach is also followed in
challenges to validity based on a variety of grounds, such as non-compliance
with self-imposed formalities, impossibility, lack of capacity and defective
consent.
The general rule is supported by well-established principles that inﬂuence
the placement of the burden of proof. Underlying some of these principles is
the sound practical consideration of limiting the costs of deciding disputes.
The rule also draws strength from a justiﬁcation speciﬁc to the law of
contract, namely the pacta servanda sunt principle. The argument is that if
the party seeking enforcement proves that the other party freely consented to
a contract, and the other party now appears to go against his or her own word
by alleging illegality, then the other party must bear the burden of proof of
illegality. In this regard the mere fact that parties sometimes conclude
contracts in situations of weakness or inequality (for example when some
prospective employees conclude employment contracts containing restraint
of trade clauses) does not justify exceptionally placing the burden of proof of
legality on the party seeking enforcement.
However, this should not deﬂect our attention from a more fundamental
issue. A real need exists to reconsider the state of the current substantive
common-law rules on typical cases of improperly obtained consent. The
opportunity exists to extend these cases to accommodate situations where
advantage is taken of weak parties who conclude onerous contracts. In this
regard our courts are able to build on the foundations and conceptual
apparatus provided by earlier authorities. Guided further by principles laid
down in local and international statutory and model instruments, the courts
could creatively fashion new rules aimed at preventing these forms of
exploitation. While the overall burden of proof should remain on the party
seeking to escape liability under a contract they apparently agreed to, some
scope exists to protect these parties by alleviating this burden through the
creative use of presumptions.
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